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though probably unintentionally so. Likewise the conferment upon any
tribunal exercising jurisdiction under the code of complete power to define
the penalty to be imposed will, in spite of the very real excuse given in the
comment ("it is not deemed practicable to prescribe a definite penalty for
each offense"), 4 alarm many.
It is the provisions regarding national armaments and propaganda, in
Article 2, paragraphs (3) and (5),5 which raise the most serious questions.
In the former "the preparation by the authorities of a State for the em-
ployment of armed force against another State (except for defense or under
United Nations auspices)" is classified as an offense against peace and se-
curity, and so, in the latter, are "the undertaking or encouragement by the
authorities of a State of activities calculated to foment civil strife in another
State (or toleration of organized activity of this kind)." The former
would open the door to charges against any rearmament program if alleged
to be based on hostile intent, and the latter would bar any efforts to pro-
mote democratic or liberal reform in autocratic dictatorships. It is not
believed that the former would have great effect, but such charges could
certainly muddy the already clouded waters of international relations,
waters clouded by just such charges today, very badly. Finally it is not
believed that it is desirable to return to the anarchical doctrines of the
nineteenth century and admit that the character of the political system of
one country is of no concern to another, in contradiction to both the League
Covenant and the United Nations Charter.
Fortunately there will still be ample time for critical appraisal of the
draft code before adoption.
PITMAN B. POTTER
LAW AND POWER
In our contemporary disillusionment it is again becoming the fashion to
minimize both the r6le that law presently plays in the world power process
and the r6le that, with more effective organization, it could be made to play
in maintaining the values of a free, peaceful, and abundant world society.
Two recent books offer perhaps the most vigorous, explicit, and articulate
expression of this trend. One is Professor Hans J. Mlorgenthau's In De-
fense of the National i-nterest and the other is Mr. George F. Kenuan's
American Diplomacy 1900-1950.1 Both of these books inveigh mightily
4 Report, p. 14; this JouwitAL, loc. cit., p. 132.
5 Report, p. 12; this JounwAL, loc. cit., pp. 127, 128.
1 Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination
of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, pp. xii, 242, $2.65);
George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951, pp. ix, 154, $2.75), reviewed below, p. 184. Our only present interest ill
these books is as exhibits of this trend. We do not purport to offer comprehensive re-
view on other points. The books will be cited hereinafter as Morgenthau and Kennan.
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against what is characterized as a "legalistic-moralistic" approach to for-
eign policy and demand a more free-wheeling use of "old-fashioned" diplo-
matic procedures in naked power calculations and practices.2 It is be-
lieved that this attitude profoundly misconceives both power and law and
mistakes certain particular unfortunate attempts in policy formation and
application for legal proceses in general. Such misconceptions, if influen-
tial, could generate irrational policy decisions of irretrievable harm.
Legalism is for Professor Morgenthau one of the four intellectual errors
("deeply ingrained habits of thought, and preconceptions") 3 of American
postwar foreign policy. Its companion errors are utopianism, sentimental-
ism, and isolationism. Though he nowhere makes clear what he under-
stands by law, the context suggests that his reference is largely to doctrine
and to judicial settlement. His most sustained attack is upon "intoxica-
tion with moral abstractions" which is alleged to constitute one of our
"great sources of weakness and failure," 4 and he insists that the "legal-
istic approach, by its very nature, is concerned with isolated cases." 5
"The facts of life to be dealt with by the legal decisions are," he amplifies,
"artificially separated from the facts that precede, accompany, and follow
them and are thus transformed into a 'case' of which the law disposes 'on
its merits.' Once a legal case has been decided or disposed of, the problem
is solved, until a new legal case arises to be taken care of in similar fash-
ion." This legalistic approach is described as "but a logical develop-
ment from the utopian, non-political conception," as "following logically
from the assumption that international politics is not a continuous struggle
for power in which all great nations are of necessity involved." 7 Naive
distinctions are made, Professor Morgenthau asserts, between peace-loving
and aggressor nations, and hence between law-abiding and criminal ones,
and "the peace-loving nations are necessarily those who defend the existing
legal order against violent change and the aggressor nations are those who
are oblivious of their legal obligations." S Thus it comes about that the
"conflict between the two groups, instead of being seen in terms of relative
power, is conceived in the absolute terms of peace, law, and order vs. ag-
gression, crime, and anarchy," ' and the United Nations becomes a forum
for "legalistic exercises" which "have done nothing at all to bring closer
to solution the great political issues outstanding between the contenders
on the international scene." I?
For one who would put the sword of power to law, Professor Mlorgenthau
2 The quoted words are Mr. Kennan 's but Professor Morgenthau gives Mr. Kennan 's
formulations his blessing in a highly favorable review in New Republic, Vol. 125 (Oct. 22,
1951), at p. 17. 3 Morgenthau, p. 91.
4 Id., p. 4. 5 Id., p. 101.
6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. 9 Id., p. 102.
10 Ibid.
HeinOnline -- 46 Am. J. Int'l L.  103 1952
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
is, however, remarkably unclear about what he means by power and, beyond
a reiteration that "[f] oreign policy, like all politics, is in its essence a
struggle for power, waged by sovereign nations for national advantage," 1
he nowhere offers a comprehensive and consistent description of the world
power process. Though late in the book he insists that we "must recognize
that in Asia we are engaged in a struggle of ideas; a struggle for the minds
of men" and that we "must understand that this struggle operates by
rules as precise and ineluctable as those which govern economic and military
warfare," 12 his earlier repeated contrast of "moral principles" and "con-
siderations of power" 13 and his sharp admonition "that in politics moral
right and legal title are as nothing in the face of superior power" 14 sug-
gest a conception of power that comes perilously close to simple physical
force. Nowhere in his book does one get a glimpse of the great range of
institutions other than the nation-state which people manipulate for pur-
poses of power and other values or of the great range of values that people
can use as bases of power for manipulating these institutions. His concep-
tion of the scope of power practices is similarly limited: the alternatives of-
fered are "traditional diplomatic methods" and war.'; The voting proced-
ures of the United Nations have been "ineffectual and inconclusive" and
have simply strengthened "the legalistic approach to foreign policy." 1
The traditional diplomatic methods are said to consist of "negotiations, bar-
gaining, mutual concessions, compromises, with a negotiated settlement as
the goal." 17 The "pacifying function" of the negotiated settlement
"consists in the reconciliation of apparently incompatible interests."'",
The prerequisites to success are "strength and conflicting interests capable
of reconciliation." "9 Elsewhere in his book Professor Mlorgenthau at-
tacks "pactomania" as an irrational faith in agreements that "do not
register existing facts," 20 and observes that from "that iron law of inter-
national politics, that legal obligations must yield to the national interest,
no nation has ever been completely immune." 21
Despite his insistence upon "the national interest of the United States"
as the "one standard of evaluation," 22 it is not surprising that Professor
Morgenthau offers few criteria for identifying that interest under contem-
porary world conditions. He does, however, make spirited defense of "the
moral dignity of the national interest" and urges that "moralistic detrac-
tors of the national interest are guilty of both intellectual error and moral
perversion." He finds "a profound and neglected truth hidden in Hobbes'
11 Id., p. 92. 12 Id., p. 209.
is Id., pp. 13, 111. 14 Id., p. 112.
15 Id., p. 136. 'a Id., p. 101.
17 Id., p. 132. 18 Id., p. 149.
19 Ibid. 20 Id., p. 147.
21 Id., p. 144. 22 Id., p. 123.
23 Id., p. 3 3 .
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extreme dictum that the state creates morality as well as law and that there
is neither morality nor law outside the state." 24 Within the United
States, "what justice means" can "within wide limits be objectively ascer-
tained," since "interests and convictions, experiences of life and institu-
tionalized traditions have in large measure created a consensus concerning
what justice means under the conditions of American society. ' 25 As
between nations, "no such consensus exists" for "there exists no interna-
tional society so integrated as to able to define for them the concrete mean-
ing of justice and equality, as national societies do for their individual
members." -6 Hence, the appeal by one nation to moral principle against
another nation is but a perverted effort to project its own moral precon-
ceptions under the guise of a universal morality! Later in the book
practical reasons are also given for rejecting "sentimental" international
standards of morality. Thus, the Truman Doctrine, insofar as it "defines
its objectives and methods in terms of a world-embracing moral principle
. ..vitiates its consideration of the national interest and compels a for-
eign policy derived from it, as the results have shown, to be half-hearted
and contradictory in operation and threatened with failure at every
turn." 27 The doctrine has been the victim, "as all moral principles must
be," of "two congenital weaknesses: the inability to distinguish between
what is desirable and what is possible, and the inability to distinguish be-
tween what is desirable and what is essential." 28
Mr. Kennan's broadside against law and morality is brief, but even
more comprehensive. After reviewing our failings in foreign policy for
fifty years, he summarizes:
As you have no doubt surmised, I see the most serious fault of our
past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legal-
istic-moralistic approach to international problems. This approach
runs like a red skein through our foreign policy of the last fifty years.
It has in it something of the old emphasis on arbitration treaties, some-
thing of the Hague Conferences and schemes for universal disarma-
ment, something of the more ambitious American concepts of the role
of international law, something of the League of Nations and the
United Nations, something of the Kellogg Pact, something of the idea
of a universal "Article 51" pact, something of the belief in World Law
and World Government. But it is none of these, entirely. Let me
try to describe it.
It is the relief that it should be possible to suppress the chaotic and
dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the
acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints. This belief
undoubtedly represents in part an attempt to transpose the Anglo-
Saxon concept of individual law into the international field and to make
it applicable to governments as it is applicable here at home to indi-
viduals..
24 Id, p. 34. 25 Ibid.
2eIbid. 27 Id., p. 117.
28 Ibid.
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It is the essence of this belief that, instead of taking the awkward
conflicts of national interest and dealing with them on their merits
with a view to finding the solutions least unsettling to the stability of
international life, it would be better to find some formal criteria of a
juridical nature by which the permissible behavior of states could be
defined.
29
Without attempting "to deal exhaustively with this thesis or to point
out all the elements of unsoundness," Mr. Kennan nevertheless emphasizes
"some of its more outstanding weaknesses": 30
First,
the idea of the subordination of a large number of states to an inter-
national juridical regime, limiting their possibilities for aggression
and injury to other states, implies that these are all states like our own,
reasonably content with their international borders and status, at
least to the extent that they would be willing to refrain from pressing
for change without international agreement. 1
It is an unfounded "American assumption that the things for which other
peoples in this world are apt to contend are for the most part neither
creditable nor important and might justly be expected to take second place
behind the desirability of an orderly world, untroubled by international
violence." 32
Second, the legalistic-moralistic approach "tends to confer upon the
concept of nationality and national sovereignty an absolute value it did not
have before." 3 Mr. Kennan argues:
The very principle of "one government, one vote," regardless of phys-
ical or political differences between states, glorifies the concept of
national sovereignty and makes it the exclusive form of participation
in international life.34
The appropriate "function of a system of international relationship" is
not to inhibit change "by imposing a legal strait jacket upon it but rather
to facilitate it: to ease its transitions, to temper the asperities to which it
often leads, to isolate and moderate the conflicts to which it gives rise, and
to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for inter-
national life in general." -5 This, however, is a task not for law which "is
too abstract, too inflexible, too hard to adjust to the demands of the un-
predictable and the unexpected," but rather for "diplomacy in the most
old-fashioned sense of the term."" Elsewhere he suggests that "instead
of making ourselves slaves of the concepts of international law and moral-
ity," we should "confine these concepts to the unobtrusive, almost femi-
nine, function of the gentle civilizer of national self-interest in which they
find their true value." '
29 Kennan, pp. 95, 96. 30 Id., p. 97.
31 Ibid. 32 Id., p. 96.
3 Id., p. 97. '4 Ibid.
35 Id., p. 98. 36 Ibid.
37 Id., p. 54.
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Third,
the American concept of world law ignores those means of international
offense-those means of the projection of power and coercion over
other peoples-which by-pass institutional forms entirely or even
exploit them against themselves: such things as ideological attack, in-
timidation, penetration, and disguised seizure of the institutional para-
phernalia of national sovereignty.38
This is because "the legalistic approach to international affairs ignores in
general the international significance of political problems and the deeper
sources of international instability.'" 31
Finally, the legalistic approach assumes too much "concerning the possi-
bility of sanctions against offenses and violations" and "forgets the limi-
tations on the effectiveness of military coalition." 40 The more "a circle
of military associates" widens, "the more difficult it becomes to retain
political unity and general agreement on the purposes and effects of what
is being done." 41
Overriding all these "theoretical deficiencies" "inherent in the legalistic
approach," Mr. Kennan finds, however, a still greater deficieney.42  That
deficiency is:
the inevitable association of legalistic ideas with moralistic ones:
the carrying over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and
wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral
judgment.
4 -
Though rooted in "a desire to do away with war and violence," the legalistic
approach, "curiously but truly," "makes violence more enduring, more
terrible, and more destructive to political stability than did the older mo-
tives of national interest." 44 Moral indignation against law-breaking
must inevitably lead, it is urged, to insistence upon "reduction of the law-
breaker to the point of complete submissiveness-namely, unconditional
surrender," and, hence, "upon total war and total victory."'-' The maker
of a moral judgment who would snap at a gnat must apparently perforce
swallow an elephant.
To expose fully the fallacies that permeate this now common argument,
so vigorously presented by Professor Morgenthan and Mr. Kennan, would
require comprehensive description of the world power process, with indica-
tion of the all-pervasive r6les that law and morality, when appropriately
understood, play in that process. Even the barest outlines of such descrip-
tion may serve, however, to spotlight major misconceptions.
Realistic description of the world power process must begin with a much
more comprehensive notion of power than that of simple naked force applied
by nation-state to nation-state. In most useful abstraction, power is con-
38 Id., p. 98. 39 Id., p. 99.
4o Ibid. 41 Ibid.
-, Id., p. 100. 43 Ibid.
14 Id., p. 101. 45 Ibid.
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trol, control by people over other people-a relationship between people
in a decision-making process in which some are able to make decisions for
themselves and others by threats of severe deprivations or promises of high
indulgence.4 6  Meaningful exposition of a power process must, therefore,
make reference at least to the participants and their perspectives, includ-
ing the demands they make on each other, the interactions in which they
influence each other, the bases of their power, the practices they engage in,
and the effects that they get.
Observing the world scene today we can see people making identifications
and demanding values that transcend national boundaries because they have
come to know that the conditions under which they can secure their values
transcend such boundaries. The values they demand include not only
power, but such other values as respect, enlightenment, wealth, well-being,
skill, standards of right and wrong, congenial personal relationships, and
security to pursue, preserve, and increase all values by peaceful proced-
ures. 47 They seek these values in both unorganized and organized ways.
The institutions they organize for power purposes include not only nation-
states and lesser "national" governmental units of varying degrees of
independence, alliance, and subordination, but also international govern-
mental organizations, political parties, pressure groups, and private asso-
ciations which, though primarily concerned with some other value, in fact
seek direct effects upon the power process. Participants in the world
power process include, therefore, not merely individuals and nation-states,
but also all of these other groupings and organizations. Decisions which
affect the world distribution of power and other values are made at all
points in this complicated matrix of inter-related institutions, and not
simply in "old-fashioned" diplomatic negotiations. Bases of power for
participants at these many points include not only naked force, but also
the formal authority of governmental position and doctrine and effective
control over resources and wealth, enlightenment, respect, skill, well-being
and safety, conceptions of right and wrong, and loyalties. The naked
force at the disposal of a participant is in fact but the register of its con-
trol over these other values. The practices by which participants with
46 For more detailed development see Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Society (1950),
especially Ch. V.
In his earlier Polities among the Nations (1948), Professor Morgenthau offers an
appropriately broad conception of power:
I"When we speak of power, we mean man's control over the minds and actions of other
men. By political power we refer to the mutual relations of control among the holders
of public authority and between the latter and the people at large." (p. 13.)
Some of the later refinements even in this book lessen, however, the utility of this broad
conception.
47 Brief summary and documentation appear in McDougal and Leighton, "The Rights
of Man in the World Community: Constitutional Illusions Versus Rational Action," 59
Yale Law Journal 60 (1949).
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such bases shape and distribute power and other values include not merely
diplomacy and war, but a whole range of policy-forming and applying
activities. Policies are formulated, prescribed, and reformulated and re-
prescribed in agreements, conferences, resolutions, declarations, codifica-
tions, and customary behavior of foreign office and other officials as well as
by judicial and arbitral opinion.4$ Policies are applied in both interna-
tional and national fora and in countless informal interactions. Most re-
cently great constitutional charters, such as those of the United Nations
and of some of the regional organizations, formulate broad policy objec-
tives in terms of a morality common to most of mankind, commit their
subscribers to reliance upon peaceful procedures alone for change, provide
procedures for the continual review and reformulation of detailed policies,
and attempt a better organization of sanctions to make certain that the
policies so formulated are actually applied and enforced. Sanctions pres-
ently available extend in authority and fact beyond mere "military coali-
tion" to the systematic use, by both international and national officials, of
all base values by all methods-diplomatic, economic, ideological, and mili-
tary.49 The effects of this power process upon the distribution of values
in the world can, finally, best be summarized in terms of "interdependence,"
an interdependence of peoples from antipodes to antipodes for all values,
an interdependence which makes any conception of "national interest,"
apart from the interest of most of the peoples of the world, the sheerest of
illusions.
It is not a matter purely of verbal aesthetics what variables in this world
power process are described as "law." One's use of a word of such crit-
ical significance may affect understanding and, hence, control.51 Thus, the
4a Schachter, "The Place of Law in the United Nations," Annual Review of United
Nations Affairs, 1950, p. 205, offers suggestion of the rich variety of practices by which
policy is formed.
49 For a concise summary, see Report of the Collective Measures Committee, United
Nations General Assembly, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 13 (A/1891), 1951.
- Secretary General Trygve Lie's Introduction to his Sixth Annual Report to the
United Nations General Assembly makes eloquent statement of these interdependences.
One relevant passage reads:
"I believe it is important to recall that the founding of the United Nations was moti-
vated by a far more fundamental and lasting concept concerning the world than a
passing wartime alliance of great powers. This is that the peace and well-being of all
nations and peoples have become in the present age so intimately interrelated that it is
necessary for them, despite all their differences, to join in a world-wide organization
looking toward security from war, freedom and independence for the peoples, and mu-
tual economic and social progress.' (The New York Times, Oct. 12, 1951, at p. 12.)
51 The argument in Williams, "International Law and the Controversy Concerning the
Word 'Law'," 22 British Yearbook of International Law 146 (1944), that one's use of
the word is largely a matter of taste requires qualification in some degree. When one's
use of "law" and other words to describe significant variables in the world power
process is either so ambiguous or so idiosyncratic as to confuse both himself and others
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critics of "law" who use the word to refer merely to authoritative rules
or formal doctrine, policy crystallizations of the past, and who focus too
sharply upon naked force as sanction may conceal from both themselves
and others the true nature of the decision-making process. It is not sug-
gested that past authoritative formulations of policy do not greatly in-
fluence decision-makers. Such formulations play varying r~les in the
perspectives of different decision-makers and it is only rational for present
decision-makers to seek guidance from the experience of their predecessors.
Decision-making is also forward-looking, however, and decision-makers re-
spond in fact not alone to prior prescriptions but to a great many environ-
mental and predispositional variables, including doctrines which formulate
the effects of alternative decisions upon the groups which they represent
or with which they identify and which state objectives and policies for the
future.5 2  The process of decision-making is indeed, as every lawyer knows,
one of the continual redefinition of doctrine in its application to ever-
changing facts and claims. A conception of law which focuses upon doc-
trine to the exclusion of the pattern of practices by which it is given
meaning and made effective, is, therefore, not the most conducive to under-
standing. It may be emphasized, further, that official decision-makers,
the people who have formal authority and are expected to make important
decisions, may or may not make the decisions in fact. Effective control
over decisions may be located in governmental institutions, but it may also
be located in political parties or pressure groups or private associations
and the people exercising control may rely for their power not upon formal
authority but upon wealth, enlightenment, respect or other values. De-
scription which would concern itself with effects as well as with myth must
take into account this structure of effective controls over apparent gov-
ernors. Formal authority without effective control is illusion; effective
control without formal authority may be naked force. A realistic con-
ception of law must, accordingly, conjoin formal authority and effective
control and include not only doctrine but also the pattern of practices of
both formal and effective decision-makers. A democratic conception of
law may also include, to add brief detail, a commitment to change by peace-
ful procedures and to policies which prescribe a wide sharing of power and
other values, provision of procedures for the continual review and reformu-
lation of policies and representation in those procedures of all people who
are affected, provision of procedures for the interpretation and application
of policies, and the balancing of effective power necessary to make pro-
cedures secure and to put policies into practice. Within the nation-state
about the operation of such variables, a community interest in greater clarity may rea-
sonably be asserted. How such words are used may indeed vitally affect the perspec-
tives of decision-makers.
52 Some development of the theme is offered in MeDougal, "The ROle of Law in World
Politics," 20 Mississippi Law Journal 253 (1949).
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people do not rely alone upon the projection of doctrine to secure their
values. They project doctrine in constitutional and other forms, but they
also seek to balance power-within government, as between functions,
legislative, executive, and judicial, and areally, from locality to state or
province and region and nation; and between government and a host of
non-governmental organizations, parties, pressure groups, and private
associations of all kinds. Today many, if not most, observers would agree
that no combination of traditional international doctrine and "old-fash-
ioned" diplomatic procedures could be adequate to secure a comparable
balance in the world arena. The United Nations, the specialized agencies,
and the regional organizations offer the beginnings of new commitments
and of new procedures designed to secure such a balance and to organize
effective community coercion behind the doctrines of freedom, peace, and
abundance. Our actual choice is not between traditional international
doctrine and old-fashioned diplomacy but between these new commitments
and procedures and world anarchy and violence. It would seem most ir-
rational, by a simple misidentification of "law," to reject the new because
the old has failed.
From this perspective, the detailed arguments of Professor Morgenthau
and Mr. Kennan become irrelevant and unpersuasive.
Law is neither a frozen cake of doctrine designed only to protect interests
in statu quo, nor an artificial judicial proceeding, isolated from power
processes, as Professor Morgenthau suggests; 53 when understood with all
its commitments and procedures, law offers, as we have seen, a continuous
formulation and reformulation of policies and constitutes an integral part
of the world power process. Similarly, the moral goals of people-demands
for values justified by standards of right and wrong-are not mere "ab-
stractions" without antecedents or consequences. Such goals are rather
the most constructive dynamisms of conscience and character and, when
shared with others, are not "sources of weakness and failure," but rather
the most dependable bases of power and successful co-operation. The
moral perspectives of people, no less than naked force, are commonly re-
53 Reference to Professor Morgenthau's Politics Among the Nations (1948) confirms
the impression that his notion of law is so limited. Two illustrations from different
parts are:
"Law in general and, especially, international law is primarily a static social force.
It defines a certain distribution of power and offers standards and processes to ascertain
and maintain it in concrete situations." (p. 64.)
"International law is a primitive type of law resembling the kind of law which pre-
vails in certain preliterate societies, such as the Australian aborigines and the Yurok of
Northern California." (p. 211.)
Suggestions that law and morality are something apart from, and superimposed upon,
power processes may also be found in Politics Among the Nations; see Ch. VIII. It
may be recalled that Malinowski, in Crime and Custom in Savage Society (1926), ques-
tioned the notion of frozen formalism even for primitive society.
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garded as among the effective sanctions of law. 4 The whole United Nations
project and a host of other contemporary activities and commitments bear
compelling evidence of moral perspectives that today transcend the bound-
aries of nation-states. To reject these growing common demands and
identifications of the peoples of the world for a "profound and neglected
truth" from Hobbes that "the state creates morality as well as law" and,
hence, to conclude that it is moral perversion for a nation-state to clarify
its interests in terms of a wider morality, is as fantastic as it is potentially
tragic. Certainly it neither accurately reflects the aspirations of the free
peoples of the world nor effectively promotes the clear interest of the
United States in a more efficient organization of these peoples to suggest
that the issue between the free world and the totalitarian is simply one of
"relative power" and that distinctions between aggressor and non-aggressor
nations are mere moral illusions serving to protect vested interests. The
much belabored "sentimental" Truman Doctrine, though it may have
miscalculated what was possible, did not miscalculate either our common
interests with the other free peoples of the world or the conditions of inter-
dependence under which such interests must be sought-or the wisdom in
clarifying such interests and conditions in a way that enhances both our
own power and that of the whole free world.
The specific strictures of Mr. Kennan are equally off point. His first
itemized weakness of a "legalistic-moralistic" approach, that some states
are not content with their present status and that other peoples have de-
mands they put above peace, merely emphasizes a need for the legalization
and moralization of peaceful change, with more effective legislative pro-
cedures and bigger and better economic development programs. His
second alleged weakness, that such an approach by emphasis upon "one
government, one vote" confers upon national sovereignty a new "absolute
value" and tends to inhibit change, mistakes a single, present voting prac-
tice in international organizations for the whole of legal procedures, and
underestimates the capacity of such procedures to effect peaceful change.
54 In an address delivered at the second annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law on "The Sanction of International Law," Elihu Root wisely insisted
that "The force of law is in the public opinion which prescribes it." This JOUnxAL,
Vol. 2 (1908), pp. 451-453. In elaboration relevant here, he added: •
"IBeyond all this there is a consciousness that in the most important affairs of nations,
in their political status, the success of their undertakings and their processes of develop-
ment, there is an indefinite and almost mysterious influence exercised by the general
opinion of the world regarding the nation's character and conduct. The greatest and
strongest governments recognize this influence and act with reference to it ...
". .. It is difficult to say just why such opinion is of importance, because it is always
difficult to analyze the action of moral forces; but it remains true and is universally
recognized that the nation which has with it the moral force of the world's approval is
strong, and the nation which rests under the world's condemnation is weak, however
great its material power." (Ibid., pp. 455, 456.)
Of. Wright, "International Law and Power Politics," 2 Measure 123 (1951).
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His third charge, that "the American concept of world law" ignores im-
portant contemporary modes of political attack, is true only in part and,
insofar as it is true, could be corrected. His fourth point, that the "legal-
istic approach" overemphasizes the possibility of sanctions and the poten-
tialities of "military coalition," states a limitation even more applicable to
"old-fashioned" diplomacy and, as Korea has demonstrated, underestimates
the promise of improved United Nations procedures. His major emphasis,
that the "greater deficiency" is "the carrying over into the affairs of
states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state be-
havior is a fit subject for moral judgment," approaches, and, but for other
sad examples, would achieve, the incredible. How "states" alone of man's
institutions can be immunized from rational evaluation in terms of the
purposes they serve, or how a consequential morality can be made to stop
short of appraising group behavior, is nowhere explained. With both law
and morality eliminated, one can only wonder by what criteria Mr. Kennan
proposes to settle disputes between states "on their merits."
It is urgently to be hoped that attacks upon law and morality which so
profoundly misconceive law, morality and power, and their interrelations,
will not cause many of us to mistake the real choice that confronts us.
People whose moral perspectives preclude the deliberate resort to violence,
except for self-defense or organized community sanction, have in the con-
temporary world only the alternative of some form of law. The choice we
must make is not between law and no law, or between law and power, but
between ineffective and effective law. It is a choice between the doctrines
and techniques of power-balancing designed for the problems and condi-
tions of bygone days, and contemporary commitments and techniques of
power-balancing through appropriate international organization that offer
hope of progressive and accelerating movement toward a unified world
community-a choice in sum between, on the one hand, illusory doctrines,
'old-fashioned" diplomacy, and spasmodic resorts to unauthorized vio-
lence, and, on the other hand, clear moral and legal commitments to free-
dom, peace, and abundance which are sustained by organized community
coercion and which invoke, at both national and international levels, all
the contemporary instruments of power, ideological and economic as well
as diplomatic and military. It is commonplace wisdom today that progress
toward a world governed by effective law depends in the long run upon a
consensus of peoples. The rational way to promote such a world is ac-
cordingly, we suggest, not to deny, but rather to affirm and support, existing
moral perspectives and legal procedures that work toward such consensus.
From a world that had not suffered the many contemporary revolutions,
Grotius offers appropriate reminder:
. . . law is not founded on expediency alone, there is no state so power-
ful that it may not some time need the help of others outside itself,
either for purposes of trade, or even to ward off the forces of many
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foreign nations united against it. In consequence we see that even the
most powerful peoples and sovereigns seek alliances, which are quite de-
void of significance according to the point of view of those who confine
law within the boundaries of states. Most true is the saying, that all
things are uncertain the moment men depart from law."
MYREs S. IMoDOUQAL
ENDING THE WAR WITH GERMANY
Most of our Allies in the second World War, with the exception of the
Soviet Union, have already some time ago declared by municipal law that
the war with Germany has come to an end. This example has now been
followed also by this country. H. J. Res. 289, passed long ago by the House
of Representatives and passed by the Senate on October 18, 1951, was
signed by the President the next day. Under this Joint Resolution the
war with Germany came to an end on October 19, 1951, at 5:45 p.m. This
action of the Congress was taken in pursuance of a communication
1 which
the President of the United States had sent on July 9, 1951, to the Vice
President and the Speaker of the House. The Draft Resolution, annexed to
this communication, proposed:
to terminate the state of war between the United States and the
Government of Germany. Resolved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives in Congress assembled, that the state of war declared
to exist between the United States and the Government of Germany by
the Joint Resolution of Congress, approved December 11, 1941, shall
be terminated and such termination shall take effect on such date as
the President shall by proclamation designate.
As everything in the unique case of occupied Germany since 1945, this
resolution again poses interesting problems in international law, especially:
What is the significance in international law of the phrase "ending the
war," and what is meant by "Germany?"
War can come to an end, under the norms of international law,' by peace
treaty, through the mere end of hostilities and by what is known on the
Continent as "debellatio" and in Anglo-American law as "conquest and
subjugation" of the enemy state.
5 De Jure Belli ac .Pacif, 'rolegomena, in Vol. II, Classics of International Law
(Scott ed. 1925), p. 17.
1 Text in The New York Times, July 10, 1951, p. 12. For text of Joint Iesolution
and President's Proclamation, see Supplement to this JoURnAL, pp. 12-13.
2 See Josef L. Kunz, Kriegsrecht und Neutralitdtsreht (Vienna, 1935), pp. 58-61;
Oppenheim-Lauterpacht, International Law, A Treatise, Vol. II (6th ed., London, 1940),
pp. 464-480; P. Guggenheim, Lehrbuch des Vblkerrechts (Basle, 1950), Vol. II, pp.
819-821; C. Philippson, Termination of War and Treaties of Peace (London, 1916);
J. Haas, Die Zriegsbeendigung nach modernem Ffflkerrecht (Greifswald, 1918); R.
Hoppe, Die Kriegsbeendigung nach Vb1errecht und deutschem Beichsreoht (Greifawald,
1918); Strupp, in W6rterbuch des YMlkerrechts, Vol. I, pp. 713-718.
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